Are y’all actually torrenting Linux ISOs. Cus I recommend. Its way faster and fun to have a collection of like 30 distros and try and new branch of the larger Linux tree. I just assume its a joke but I only started torrenting Linux ISO because of seeing it replied so much lol.

      • cobra89@beehaw.org
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        0
        ·
        8 months ago

        If you can orchestrate an hash conflict attack across many seeders for a file the size of an ISO then you’ve earned it lol. That’s like government agency levels of complexity and even then it’s still a bit of a stretch cuz there are easier ways.

      • NightAuthor@lemmy.world
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        0
        ·
        8 months ago

        What’s the risk here? Isn’t the chance of collision so low that it’s virtually impossible for someone to create a malicious payload that has the same hash as the original file?

        • pedroapero@lemmy.ml
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          0
          ·
          8 months ago

          Last published attack estimated the prefix generation (not random collision) to less than 100k$.

            • cecilkorik@lemmy.ca
              link
              fedilink
              English
              arrow-up
              0
              ·
              edit-2
              8 months ago

              To be fair, in the case of something like a Linux ISO, you are only a tiny fraction of the target or you may not even need to be the target at all to become collateral damage. You only need to be worth $1 to the attacker if there’s 99,999 other people downloading it too, or if there’s one other guy who is worth $99,999 and you don’t need to be worth anything if the guy/organization they’re targeting is worth $10 million. Obviously there are other challenges that would be involved in attacking the torrent swarm like the fact that you’re not likely to have a sole seeder with corrupted checksums, and a naive implementation will almost certainly end up with a corrupted file instead of a working attack, but to someone with the resources and motivation to plan something like this it could get dangerous pretty quickly.

              Supply chain attacks are increasingly becoming a serious risk, and we do need to start looking at upgrading security on things like the checksums we’re using to harden them against attackers, who are realizing that this can be a very effective and relatively cheap way to widely distribute malware.